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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Bonding Company seeks by this
appeal to reverse the District Court's refusal to require
W. J. Saunders to pay the loss suffered by plaintiff
Bates by reason of Saunders' failure to deliver title to
the car which Saunders sold to Bates, and the Court's
refusal to hold Saunders on his agreement to indemnify
1
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the defendant Bonding Company, together with other
error hereinafter pointed out.
In 1949 Jimmie Simpson and W. J. Saunders commenced operating a used car lot at 999 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 151) Arrangements
for the rental of the lot were made by Simpson with the
owner of the property, the Utah Motor Parks, for both
Simpson and Saunders. (R. 151) Simpson and Saunders
each paid his share of the rent; they shared the telephone, shared the furnishings and the building that was
moved on to the property. The building was located in
the center of the lot and the cars were displayed on the
lot. Across the top of the building was a large sign
through the center of which ran the words "Used Cars",
and at one end appeared the name of ''Saunders'' and
at the other end of the sign appeared the name of
"Simpson". ( R. 127) Saunders and Simpson had each
secured a license from the State of Utah as a used car
dealer, and each had secured and furnished a bond from
the defendant The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd.
The plaintiff came to the lot to look at cars on
November 5, 1949, and met the defendant Jimmie Simpson, and after trying out a 1947 Chevrolet Sedan, signed
a used car order which appears as Exhibit A. (R. 77)
This order was never signed by any person as dealer
or seller. This 1947 Chevrolet sedan had been brought to
Salt Lake by Simpson under consignment from BrokawBauer, an automobile company in Los Angeles, Cali2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fornia. The title was to be forwarded to the Continental
Bank by Brokaw-Bauer and to be picked up under a
draft at the bank by Simpson. (Exhibit 11) The car
had been placed on the lot and had been there for some
seYeral days prior to the visit by Bates.
There was no statement made by Simpson to Bates
as to who owned the automobile, but as stated by Bates,
Simpson told him that title to the car would be retained
by the finance company until Bates had paid out the
purchase price. (R. 110) Bates stated that Simpson
told him that Bates could drive the car on the California
license plates which it carried for three weeks, and that
Simpson would take care of the transfer of the plates
and the registration of the car. Bates turned in an
automobile for which he was given credit in the sum
of $500.00, and on the 5th of November, 1949, he endorsed the title to the automobile turned in to Simpson
and left the car at the lot.
At the time of this transaction Simpson told Bates
that he did not know just where the car would be financed;
that his partner and finance man Bill Saunders at that
time was out on a pheasant hunt, and that that matter
would have to be handled at a later date. (R. 77 -80)
Upon Bates' return to the lot sometime during the
following week, he was advised by Simpson that Saunders had financed the deal through Strevell-Paterson
Finance Company. (R. 84) At the time of the transaction on November 5th, Simpson wrote out in longhand
a copy of Exhibit 1, which carries the same information
3
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according to the witness Bates, as contained in Exhibit
1, other than that the seller was left blank in the copy
given Bates. Bates claims to have lost that copy; nevertlieless, Bates signed Exhibit 1 in original and three
copies, and other than for Bates' signature, Exhibit 1
was entirely blank and unfilled. (R. 80)
Upon Saunders' return from the pheasant hunt the
deal with Bates was presented to Saunders by Simpson
with the request that Saunders assist Simpson in his
effort to secure financing through Strevell-Paterson
Finance Company. At that time Simpson had a credit
report on Bates and went over the entire transaction
with Saunders, giving him the information on Bates and
the transaction as heretofore set forth. Saunders had
previously known of this car having been brought to
the lot from California by Simpson, and was aware of
the car's condition and its worth. Saunders was also
advised that title to the car was held by Brokaw-Bauer
in California, and could not be obtained until a draft
had been paid for the car at Continental Bank. (R. 202}
The draft from Brokaw-Bauer was not forwarded to
the Continental Bank until November 25, 1951. (See
Exhibit 11.)
Saunders took the four blank title retaining contracts to Strevell-Paterson Finance Company, together
with the used car order (Exhibit A), and presented
these documents, together with the credit rating on
Bates, to Mr. Minson of Strevell-Paterson Finance
Company. Minson filled in the contract (Exhibit B and
4
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Exhibit 1} from the information on the used car order,
and Saunders signed the purchase agreement as the
Seller-Dealer. (R. :247) This took place on November
15, 1949, and a copy of the agreement was shortly thereafter mailed to Bates and he received it sometime between the 17th and 20th days of November, 1949.
Thereafter Bates made three payments of $66.00
each to Strevell-Paterson Company in accordance with
the provisions of the contract. (Ex. 9) Strevell-Paterson
Company, on November 15, 1949, gave to Saunders its
check in the sum of $900.00, the balance owing by Bates.
Saunders cashed that check and gave to Jimmie Simpson his check for $870.10, with the endorsement on the
check, ''Payment in full for 1947 Chevrolet Sedan,
:Motor No. N 172835". (Exhibit 7) Simpson then went
to the Continental Bank to secure the title to the 1947
Chevrolet and the draft and the title were not then at
the bank, and he returned and reported this fact to
Saunders. (R. 214) Saunders then had Simpson execute
Exhibit 6, being an assignment of the automobile to
Saunders.
The testimony shows that Saunders had an avenue
of credit established at Strevell-Paterson, and by reason
of that credit was able to do financing with that Company. Simpson had his credit established with the
Capitol Finance Company and was able by reason of
that credit to do his financing through Capitol. However, Saunders could not deal at Capitol and Simpson
could not deal at Strevell-Paterson. (R. 157) At the

5
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time of this transaction, Simpson advised Saunders that
Capitol was unable to give him financing because their
money was out on small loans as it was nearing the
Christmas season, and he asked Saunders to help him
by getting the contract financed through Strevell-Paterson. Simpson and Saunders agreed that Saunders should
receive the $70.00 reserve for his part in securing this
financing. (R. 157)
Saunders contacted Simpson at several intervals
between November 15, 1949, and January 7, 1950, and
during which two-month period Simpson at all times
indicated he would get the title from the bank. Saunders
at no time attempted to secure the title himself from
the bank and at all times indicated he was satisfied to
rely upon the assurance of Simpson that Simpson would
get the title. Neither did Saunders at any time attempt
to register the car at the State Capitol. Bates last saw
Simpson December 17th at the used car lot, at which
time Simpson indicated to Bates that he would get
him the plates to the car in just a few days, and Saunders last saw Simpson January 7, 1950.
The Brokaw-Bauer people commenced an action in
the Third District Court in Utah, by which proceeding
they picked up the 1947 Chevrolet Sedan automobile
from Bates.
Saunders and Simpson, during the several months
that they had been together, had joined in several joint
ventures, one of them being a trip to Nevada and Cali6
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fornia in which they picked up a number of cars and
brought them back to Salt Lake City, where they were
sold and the profits and expenses shared. (R. 202) They
had on other occasions joined in the financing of ''deals''
for each other the same as on the Bates transaction.
(R. 202)
Simpson was not served in this case and the Court
tried the case without Simpson as a party. Judgment
was given the plaintiff Bates for the value of the car
he turned in, together with attorney's fees and costs
in defending the Brokaw-Bauer action for a total judgment of $933.52, and the Court dismissed Bates' action
against Saunders. The Court gave Saunders judgment
against the Bonding Company for $867.75.. The judgment of Saunders was made up of the sums charged
agairfst his account by Strevell-Paterson in the amount
aforesaid. However, the District Court refused to take
into consideration the fact that Saunders had retained
out of the check to Simpson the sum of $29.90 for which
credit was never given. The Court dismissed the crosscomplaint of the Bonding Company against Saunders.

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AND eONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS WAS LIABLE
TO BATES AS A CO-TORTFEASOR WITH SIMPSON.
(a) The sale to Bates was a joint venture participated in by Simpson and Saunders. Both Simpson and

Saunders received bene fits by reason of the transaction.
(b) Saunders, with all the knowledge of facts in

Simpson's possession, made the same representations
to Bates as did Simpson.
(c) Saunders violated the statutes of the State of
Utah in the same manner and to the same extent oo did
Simpson.

POINT NO. II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT SAUNDERS' UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
PRECLUDED HIM FROM MAINTAINING AN ACTION AGAINST HIS CO-TORTFEASOR, SIMPSON.
(a) Saunders is precluded from maintaining an action against Simpson by virtue of Section 57-6-5, Utah
Code Arunotated, 1943, as amended.

Cb) The law leaves the wrongdoer where it finds

him.

8
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POINT NO. III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
.AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT S~-\.UNDERS WAS BY CONTRACT,
ACT AND REPRESENTATION PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR ~\NY LOSS SUFFERED BY BATES.

POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT BETWEEN BATES AND SIMPSON FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF THE 1947 CHEVROLET IN
QUESTION.
(a) The only contract in existence concerning the
said automobile was between Bates as the buyer and
Saunders as seller.
(b) The parol evidence rule prohibits the introduc-

tion of evidence to vary the terms and to substitute
the parties of written instruments.
(c) Saunders is estopped to deny that he was the
seller of the automobile to Bates in view of his express
representations to Bates and to Strevell-Paterson Fi-

nance Company.
(d) If there was no joint venture, Simpson was not

liable to Bates.
9
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POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
SIMPSON WAS LIABLE TO SAUNDERS FOR VIOLATION OF THE ACT.
(a) 1~he Court erred in finding that Simpson sold
Saunders a contract, since Simpson did not have a contract with Bates.
(b) No statutory liability exists as to the sale of a
contract as distinguished from the sale of am automobile.

POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LIMITED, CREDIT AS
AGAINST SAUNDERS FOR $29.90 PAID TO SAUNDERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING LICENSE PLATES AND PAYING SALES TAX.
POINT NO. VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS IS LIABLE
TO EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., FOR ALL AMOUNTS AWARDED
TO BATES AGAINST SAUNDERS ANDJOR SIMPSON IN THIS TRANSACTION ON THE BOND APPLICATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAUNDERS
AND EMPLOYERS.

10
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POINT NO. VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAI\E
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE ALLEGATION
OF THE COMPLAINT OF BATES AND THE CROSSCO~IPLAINT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
ASSURAXCE CORPORATION, LTD., AGAINST
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-DEFENDANT SAUNDERS.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS WAS LIABLE
TO BATES AS A CO-TORTFEASOR WITH SIMPSON.
(a) The sale to Bates was a joint venture partici-

pated in by Simpson and Saunders. Both Simpson and
Sa'/1/Ybders received bene fits by reason of the transaction.

On November 5, 1949, at the used car lot, Simpson
told Bates that Bill Saunders was his partner ; that they
would finance the car at one of two finance companies,
either Strevell-Paterson or Capitol Finance (R. 84).
On November 7th Simpson again told Bates that Saunders, his partner and finance man, was away hunting
and the financing would be taken care of when he returned. (R. 83)
Subsequent to November 7th, but during the week
following November 5th, Bates contacted Simpson again
11
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and he was told by Simpson that his partner Bill Saunders had got the car financed through Strevell-Paterson.
At Page 85 of the record, Bates states that when he got
the signed contract showing Saunders as the seller, he
presumed everything was all right, because Simpson
had told him before that Bill Saunders had got it
financed through Strevell-Paterson and he "couldn't
see anything wrong with it".
At Page 110 of the record Bates states that no
mention was made as to who the dealer would be. The
only discussion was as to the finance company and that
it would be one of two finance companies, and in answer
to the question:
'' Q. Did he say that it might be either himself
or Saunders that would be the dealer~

he replied:
A. Well, that was later. He didn't say anything about who might be. He told me later
that Saunders was his partner and he had
got it through Strevell-Paterson."
Page 111:
'' Q. Weren't you concerned at all when you
bought a car from-thought you had bought
a car from Simpson and the contract came
out that you had bought it from Saunders T

A. Well, the two names was on the place there.
I couldn't see anything wrong with it."
In January, 1950, Bates went to Blair Motor Company to locate Saunders, and when Bates drove up Saun-

12
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ders walked out to him and said: ''I'll bet you're looking for me'', and in answer to the question : ''You're
positive that Saunders came up to you and knew who
you weref'' Bates answered, ''A. Well, it appeared
that way.''
Saunders' own explanation appears on R. 154 as
follows:

"Q. Were you on the used car lot at 999 South
State!
A. Oh, yes.
Q. On or about November of 19491 .

A. Oh, yes.
Q. Now, when this contract was brought to you,

was there any signature on the lines 'SellerDealer', 'Title', or 'Dealer's Address' 1
A. No.
Q. Now, what was the purpose of you taking

the position of the seller of this automobile
to l\Ir. Bates~
A. Well, Strevell-Paterson didn't do business
with Jimmie Simpson. In order for me to
get it financed I had to sign it.
Q. In other words, Strevell-Paterson wouldn't
finance this unless you were the seller 1

A. That's correct.
Q. They wouldn't extend credit to Simpson~

A. They done no dealings with Simpson.
Q. Now what then was the purpose of your

signing on the line, 'Seller-Dealer' other
than to enable you to go to the Strevell-

13
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Paterson and represent that you were the
one that sold the ca:r; to Bates?
A. Well, in order to cash the contract.''
On Page 155 of the transcript:

"Q. Now what consideration did you get out of
it'
A. Well, Strevell-Paterson paid me a reserve
of $70.00 for bringing them that contract.''
On Page 157 of the transcript:
'' Q. Now it was the $70.00 that brought you into
this deal ; the chance to pick up $70.00,
wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. He (Simpson) came down and told you he
couldn't get it financed at Capitol, didn't
he~

A. That's right.

Q. And wanted you to lend your aid in getting
it financed~
A. That's right.''
Page 158 of the transcript:
'' Q. But you were the one that represented that
you owned the car and you were selling and
that the title was coming out to you?

A. I guaranteed it, yes.
Q. No, but that you had the title as seller?

A. Yes, that's right.

14
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Q. So you were the one that had to get that
title then, weren't you?
A. rh uh.
At Page 195 of the transcript appears the following:

'' Q. Had Simpson ever helped you out at Capitol
on a deal like this?
A. Possibly.

Q. Definitely he did, didn't he?
A. Well, I don't know the case, but it's possible. He bought the car from me and sold
it."
As to the transaction between Simpson and Saunders, the story appears on Pages 202 and immediately
following of the transcript as follows:
'' Q. What authority did you have to do that?
(Insert Saunders' name as seller.)

A. Well, I had his okey on it. _
Q. If you had his okey tell me where you got
that okey and what was said.

A. Well, he gave it to me.

Q. Xow, what was said in this conversation between you and Simpson?
A. Well, he called me up and I went down and
he asked me if I would cash it. I looked
over the credit rating; I knew the car, I
knew what he was talking about.

Q. He showed you the contracts, Exhibit 1 and
Exhibit B, didn't he?
A. In blank. All he had was pages signed.

15
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Q. And so you wanted to know something about
the deal, didn't you 1
A. Naturally.
Q. So you found out at that time some of the
facts concerning the car, didn't you 1

A. Oh, who was purchasing it, yes, and the
amount.
Q. Now you had already known that the car
had come from California, from B-rokawBauer¥

A. Yes.

Q. As the result of Simpson's trip to California¥
A. Yes.

Q. The same kind of a trip that you and Simpson had been on in July of the same year,
a trip to buy cars¥
A. I went on one trip to California, yes.

Q. Then you knew that the title of the car was
with a draft at the Continental Bank¥
A.

When~

Q. When you were talking with Simpson on or
about the 15th of November~
A. Yes.

Q. He told you all about

that~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. He showed you, did he show you the orded

A. Yes.
Q. Under which the car had been purchased by
Bates~

16
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A. Yes, sir.

Q. He told you all of the circumstances concerning the sale and the transfer to Bates f
A. Yes.
Q. He told you a little about Bates' background·?

A. Well, it was all in writing. I could see it
and read it for myself.
Q. You told him the car could be operated on
California plates~

A. He didn't tell me until a few days later.

Q. You were to see that the title was transferred up to the State Capitol because you
were to pay the tax~
A. Very true.
Q. And that was because you had assumed the
position of seller~

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Did you inquire whether it had been properly
registered in any way at the State Capitol
before you placed your name as the seller
on this contract~
A. No.

Q. Was anything said about who would get
the reserve ~
A. Well, it was understood I would get it if I
done it for him. Strevell-Paterson certainly
wouldn't.

Q. If you did this for Simpson, then you would
get the reserve?
A. Strevell-Paterson would pay me.
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Q. So actually what this deal was, was purely
an arrangement between you and Simpson
whereby you would both get a profit out of
the sale of this car to Bates ¥
A. Well, Simpson wouldn't pay me the profit.
Q. No, each one of you would get your profit
by selling this car to Bates 1

A. I would make $70.00 if he had been all right.
At Page 211 of the transcript:

"Q. Who gave you the authority to put your
nanie in as seller 1
A. Simpson.

Q. Now what was said about itT
A. Well, that he couldn't cash the contract with
his finance company and if I would do it
he would appreciate it very much. I had no
reason to distrust Simpson. You don't think
for a minute I would have passed that money
over if I had any alarm over the deal.

Q. Well, you had been in on these deals all the
way along, you had full confidence in him 1
A. I trusted Simpson.
Q. So that once again by entering into this

contract with Bates, you yourself had made
the same representation that you would get
the title so that it could be financed?
A. I would have if Simpson hadn't defaulted

on his end of it.
Q. So that representation is the same to

Bates~

isn't it?
A. Yes, sir."
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At Page

~1~:

'' Q. Now, :Mr. Saunders, you knew that $870.00
wouldn't pay the balance on the draft at
the bank at the time you turned it over to
Simpson?
A. Certainly.

Q. You knew that Simpson had to get some
more money to pay thatT
.A. Certainly.

Q. So you merely relied upon Simpson's credit
to go up and get the draft from the bank T
A. Certainly.

Q. In fact, you were leaving this whole thing
to Simpson and you were acting merely for
the purpose of lending your credit? This
was still Simpson's deal?
A. That's right."

At Page 219 of the transcript:

"Q. But at any rate on January 5,1950, you were
still having full trust and confidence in
Simpson?
A. Well, certainly.

Q. Had there been anything said or indicated
by Simpson at any time up until then that
he was not going to get this title?

A. I should say not.
Q. Now if you were to get the license plates
and arrange for the transfer did you have
delivered to you an application signed by
Bates for that transferT
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A. Yes.''
At Page 246 of the transcript Mr. Minson, the car
finance agent for Strevell-Paterson, in answer to questions by Saunders' attorney, testified as follows:

"Q. But, Mr. Minson, if Mr. Saunders brought
this in with Haskell N. Bates' signature-!
refer to Exhibit 1-the rest of the document
blank, and he had with him the document
which shows as the purchase order which
goes with the sale and he was willing to sign
this and signed it in your presence and you
would loan him money on it, wouldn't you¥
A. That's right.
Q. In fact, that is what has happened in this
case, isn't it¥

A. That is correct.''
On Page 247 Mr. Minson states:

"Q. Did you see Mr. Saunders when he brought
the document into you.

A. Yes, I filled out the transaction and issued
the check.
Q. Now as to the arrangement between Simpson and Saunders, you don't know whether
they split commissions on deals or not, do
you¥

A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know wh~her they shared expenses on the lot, do you¥

A. Mr. Saunders said they did. Told us they
did.''
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Simpson represented and held out Saunders as his
partner and finance man, and told Bates that the car
would be financed by his partner. The two were on the
same lot ; their names were on a common sign, advertising their business; they shared their expenses; they
had previously shared on a similar transaction in
bringing cars from California; they assisted each other
in their financing, and in the Bates transaction, the deal,
though still Simpson's, was arranged so as to give
Saunders at least $70.00 of the profit on the sale and
financing. The inescapable conclusion must be that
Saunders acted as and was in fact a partner, or at least
a joint venturer or actor with Simpson in consummating
this transaction.
Saunders knew that neither he nor Simpson had the
title when he signed the contract to Bates and when he
sold the contract to Strevell-Paterson. On that date he
knew that neither the title nor the draft was at the Continental Banlr. On that date he knew it would be several
days before that title would be delivered. On that date he
knew that Simpson, like himself, must secure additional
money from some source to meet the draft at the bank.
With equal knowledge of all of the facts he made the same
representation to Bates that Simpson had made, and in
addition had made the same representation as to title
to Strevell-Paterson by inserting his name as seller into
the contract. The facts are clear that Saunders joined
with Simpson in a misrepresentation of this transaction
to both Bates and Strevell-Paterson in order to secure
the money on the Bates contract, and assumed equally
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with Simpson the obligation to deliver title to Bates, as
required by Section 57-6-5, U.C.A., 1943.
The law is clear that one whose conduct is a sub.
stantial contribution to the damage or loss suffered is
liable to the same extent as a joint tortfeasor. The facts
of this case establish Saunders and Simpson as joint
tortfeasors, but the law does not require that we need
go that far in establishing the relationship to hold Saunders for his acts, if such acts constitute a substantial
contribution to the loss.

IS

Section 879 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts
as follows :
"Except as stated in Section 881, each of two
persons who is independently guilty of tortious
conduct, which is a substantial factor in causing
a harm to another, is liable for the entire harm,
in the absence of a superseding cause."
''Comment:
'' (a) A person whose tortious conduct is
otherwise one of the legal causes of an injurious
result is not relieved from liability for the entire
harm by the fact that the tortious act of another
responsible person contributes to the result. Nor
are the damages against him diminished. This is
true where both are simultaneously negligent, and
also where the act of one either occurs, or takes
harmful effect after that of another. It is immaterial that as between the two, one of them
was primarily at fault causing the harm, or that
the other upon payment of damages, would have
indemnity against him. It is also immaterial that
the conduct of one was seriously wrongful, while
the conduct of the other was merely negligent, or,
22
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indeed, blameless. Likewise it is immaterial that
the liability of one is based upon common-law
rules, while that of the other is based upon a
statute." Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol.
5, P. 446.
Section 876 of the Restatement of Law of Torts is
as follows:
"For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious· conduct of another, a person is liable
if he * * *
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes
a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so as to conduct
himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other
in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a
breach of duty to the third person.''
The comment upon Clause (c) is as follows :
"Where a person personally participates in
causing a particular result in accordance with an
agreement with another, he is responsible for the
result of the united effort if his act, considered
by itself, constitutes a breach of duty and is a
substantial factor in causing the result, irrespective of his knowledge that his act or the act of
the other is tortious.'' (emphasis supplied.)
See Restatement of Torts, Vol. 4, Pages 435, 436,
439.

In the case at bar it is undisputed that Saunders'
conduct was a substantial factor in the accomplishment
of the sale to Bates. Two factors were necessary to
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complete that sale. The first was a customer ready,
willing and able to purchase the 1947 Chevrolet automobile. That customer was produced by Simpson in the
person of Bates. The second Factor was the obtaining
of the financing necessary to complete the transaction.
This f~ctor could not be produced by Simpson and it
was necessary for Saunders to participate to obtain it.
Saunders represented to Strevell-Paterson Finance
Company and to Bates that he, Saunders, was the seller
of the automobile and the owner of it. There can be no
doubt, therefore, that the lending of his name as seller
by Saunders was an essential factor in the accomplishment of the sale. It certainly was a "substantial factor"
within the meaning of the law as stated by the editors
of the Restatement.
We desire that the Court understand our position
is that there was a joint adventure, a common enterprise, participated in and benefited by Simpson and
Saunders, and that the law of joint venture, therefore,
is applicable. However, even if it should be determined
that there was no technical joint venture, under the
principle stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts
herein enumerated, Saunders was liable to Bates for his
actions in participating in the result. His conduct was
"a substantial factor in causing the result" in any instance, and Judge Van Cott erred in failing to so find.
(b) Saunders, with all the knowledge of facts in

Simpson's possession, made the same representations
to Bates as did Simpson.
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The Court found that defendant _Simpson (R. 42)
"falsely and fraudulently, with intent to deceive and
defraud plaintiff, misrepresented to plaintiff: (1) That
he had good title to a certain 194 7 Fleetline Chevrolet
Automobile, motor No. N-172835 CAL with the right to
sell same to plaintiff; (2) that said defendant would
obtain registration of title and license plates for said
automobile for plaintiff; (3) that the finance company
through which he would finance plaintiff's contract of
purchase would hold title to said automobile until paid
for."
The Court further found that Simpson represented
to plaintiff that "W. J. Saunders was said Jimmie Simpson's finance man and was said Simpson's partner and
that as said Jimmie Simpson's finance man and partner, W. J. Saunders would finance said automobile with
Strevell-Paterson Finance Company", and "that the
only reason said Jimmie Simpson had not obtained
license plates on said automobile for plaintiff was because said Jimmie Simpson had been so busy.'' (Findings of Fact X os. 3, 4 and 5 ; R. 42.)
The Court found that the representations that Simpson would obtain registration of title and license plates
and the finance company through which he would finance
plaintiff's contract "were false representations of said
Jimmie Simpson's intentions and plans, said Jimmie
Simpson did not then intend, and never has intended to
carry out said representations. (R. 42.)
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The portion of the Court's finding as to non-existence of intentions is absolutely unsupported by the evidence. The record is completely devoid of any evidence
to support a finding that Simpson did not intend to
comply with the promises when made; in fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Simpson went down to the
Continental Bank, Central Branch, to pay the amount
of the draft, when Saunders gave the check on November
15, 1949, and before the draft had arrived from Los Angeles. (R. 214) How can it be said that he did not intend
to pay the draft and pick up the title and obtain registration of title and plates when he attempted to perform
these very acts within a day or two after the promises
were made?
The intentions of an -actor can only be determined
by what he says and what he does at the time the intentions were relevant. It is submitted that there was not
even an attempt by plaintiff to prove the intentions of
Simpson at the time the contract was entered into and
the statements made. The only evidence on the subject
is that he made a trip to the bank to pay the draft and
pick up the title, as herein stated.
In the case of Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Corp., 87 Utah 69, 48 Pac. (2d) 439, the Court
expressly held that non-performance of a promise alone
is not evidence of fraud. The Court said :
"To predicate a cause of action in fraud upon
a failure to perform a promise, there must be an
26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

intention on the part of the promisor at the time
of making the- promise not to perform it.
'If the promise is made in good faith when
the contract is entered into there is no fraud,
though the promisor subsequently changes his
mind and fails or refuses to perform.' 12 R. C.
L. 262; Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2d)
56. Nonperformance of the promise alone is not
evidence of fraud. 12 R. C. L. 255."
The other findings of the Court were that Simpson
represented that he had title to the automobile; that
Saunders was Simpson's finance man and partner; that
Strevell-Paterson would act as finance company, and
that the only reason Simpson had not picked up the
plates was because he had been so busy. The latter of
these is obviously irrelevant and immaterial in this
matter because it occurred after the purported sale and
was not in any way an inducement, or intended as an
inducement, to obtain the sale. Any wrongful act of
Simpson's was prior to that time. Moreover, there is
nothing to support the finding that this latter allegation,
if made, was not true. Certainly there is nothing about
it that would support an action for fraud or deceit if
this representation was standing alone.
Strevell-Paterson did act as the finance company,
and t4ere is no justification, therefore, for the Court
finding as it did in Findings Nos. 7 and 8 (R. 32-43)
that this representation was not true. All the plaintiff's
evidence and all the evidence in the case shows that
Strevell-Paterson did act as finance company. Likewise,
what can be claimed for the representation that Saun.
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ders was Simpson's finance man and partner~ The fact
is that Saunders did lend his name in this very transaction as seller and dealer. He was the joint venturer
in the transaction. He did obtain the financing. He
was Simpson's finance man and partner as far as this
transaction is concerned. Moreover, the record is d~void
of evidence that plaintiff relied upon this representation when he got the contract from Strevell-Paterson
showing Saunders as the seller; he was satisfied with it.
Plaintiff was not interested particularly whether he was
buying this automobile from Saunders or Simpson or
John Doe, or any other person who may have left the
automobile on the lot. (R. 85, 86-88, 89)
What representation did Simpson make to Bates in
which Saunders did not join and participate~ If the
representation was that Simpson had good title to the
Chevrolet, it cannot be said that Bates relied upon it
because when the contract came showing that the owner
was Saunders, Bates accepted it and was satisfied with
it. If the representation was that Saunders had good
title to the automobile, Saunders made that representation himself by signing Exhibit 1 as seller. The statements with reference to registration, the finance company and the obtaining of license plates were made by
Saunders to the same extent and in the same way they
were made by Simpson when Saunders signed the purchase contract, Exhibit 1.
There is no question as to the legal principle that
even if Saunders had not been liable in his own right
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and for his own participation in any misrepresentations
to Bates, he is liable for his ratification of Simpson's
statements.
·'Liability in tort may be predicated upon the
ratification of a wrongful act after it is done,
where the act benefited, or was done in the interest
of, the person adopting the same, and was ratified
with full knowledge of the facts. The liabiilty in
such case is joint and several.''
52 . A.m. Juris., P. 455, Sec. 115.
It is apparent that the Trial Judge simply brushed
over the law of deceit and fraud in an effort to hold the
Bonding Company liable, without permitting it to recover against the real tortfeasors on its indemnity agreement. In every relevant matter Saunders made the same
representation, had the same intention, was aware of
the same facts and was guilty of the same misconduct
as was Simpson. Failure of the Court so to find is
clearly reversible error.
(c) Saunders violated the statutes of the State of
Utah in the same ma;nner and to the same extent as did
Simpson.

The Court found:
''That the defendant, Jimmie Simpson violated the laws of the State of Utah in that he
failed to register said used motor vehicle which
was brought into the state for the purpose of resale, within ten days; failed to take out a bond
on such vehicle to protect the purchaser against
loss of title; failed to obtain a certificate of title
29
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from the state tax commission within forty-eight
hours after sale of said vehicle; failed to transfer
any title or interest or certificate of registration
to plaintiff or the company financing such transaction as transferee of said motor vehicle; failed
to give notice of such transfer to the Motor Vehicle Division of the Utah State Tax Commission;
and sold plaintiff a used motor vehicle to which
said Jimmie Simpson had no right, title or interest
in or to." (Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 43-44.)
It has been heretofore pointed out that Simpson
and Saunders were joint venturers in the sale of the
automobile to Bates, and that Saunders was the actual
seller by virtue of the sales contract (Exhibit 1). He
was also the dealer, as indica ted in said contract. By
reason of his being a joint venturer, and being the actual
seller-dealer, the same obligations devolved on him as
on Simpson. While Simpson physically drove the automobile into the state, Saunders was a real party in interest. Certainly insofar as the statute confers any
rights upon the buyer, the proximate cause to plaintiff
was as much Saunders' violation of the statute in his
failure to perform the obligations thereby created as
Simpson's failure to comply and perform.
This defendant does not admit that the statute referred to confers any private right on the plaintiff, or
that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause
of any damage to plaintiff. However, Saunders and
Simpson were guilty of the same violation to the same
extent and in the same manner. Here again, the Court
glossed over the rights of the Bonding Company by
30
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holding one of the tortfeasors liable and not the other,
so that the Bonding Company could not protect itself
upon its indemnity agreement.
POINT NO. II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT SAUNDERS' UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
PRECLUDED HIM FROM MAINTAINING AN ACTIOX AG.A.IXST HIS CO-TORTFEASOR, SIMPSON.
(a) Saunders is precluded from maintaining an action against Simpson by virtue of Section 57-6-5, Utah

Code .Annotated, 1943, as amended.
Section 57-6-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
provides as follows :
"Every ~erson, firm, or corporation upon the
sale and delivery of any used or second-hand
motor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed'' ( apparently should be "endorse") "according to· law,
a certificate of title, issued for said vehicle by the
state tax commission.''
Section 57-6-6 provides :
''No· action or right of action to recover any
such motor vehicle, or any part of the selling
price thereof, shall be maintained in the courts
of this state by any such dealer or vendor, his
successors or assigns, in any case wherein such
vendor or dealer shall have failed to comply with
the terms and provisions of this act, and such
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vendor or dealer, upon conviction of the violation
of any of the provisions of this act shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $299 or by
imprisonment for not more than six months in
the county jail, or both such fine and imprisonment.''
(b) The law leaves the wrongdoer where it finds

him.
As heretofore stated, Simpson and Saunders are
guilty of the same unlawful acts, both as to misrepresentation and violation of the statutory obligations respecting sellers of used motor vehicles. In this action
Saunders is in the position of attempting to recover
from his conspirator as a result of what Saunders claims
to be the neglect of the conspirator to carry out his
part of the unlawful bargain. It is as though one thief
was attempting to recover from his partner in crime
one-halY of the ill-gotten gain.
The principle is fundamental that the law will not
permit itself to be used to aid a wrongdoer in the perpetuation of his wrong or to recover against a co-wrongdoer. The failure of the Trial Court to apply this principle to the case at bar was erroneous. Saunders is in
no position to complain of Simpson by reason of his
own conduct and his conspiracy with Simpson in the
very wrong for which he attempts to recover.
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POINT NO. III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AS A FACT AND CONCLUDE AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT SAUNDERS WAS BY CONTRACT,
ACT AND REPRESENTATION PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS SUFFERED BY BATES.
As pointed out in Point No. I of this brief, the liability of Simpson was predicated upon two theories. The
first was a theory of fraud and misrepresentation; the
second was violation of the Utah statute requiring the
seller to furnish the buyer with a certificate of title
within forty-eight hours and requiring the seller to perform certain other acts incident to the delivery of title
and obtaining registration.
The Trial Judge erroneously found and concluded
that Saunders had no duty to perform any of the acts
required by the statute, and that he was guilty of no
fraud. However, not only was he a co-tortfeasor with
Simpson, but his own testimony is that as between himself and Simpson he was primarily obligated to obtain
the registration of the automobile and deliver the certificate of title. Saunders' testimony on this matter is
in part as follows: (R. 207)
"Q. Let me ask you one other question, then,
along that line. You have already told the
Court that there was an amount that you
retained to get license plates and to pay
the sales tax~
A. Correct.
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Q. So you were to see that the license plates

were secured~
A. True.
Q. Because you kept the
A. True.

money~

Q. You were to see that the title was transferred up to the State Capitol because you
were to pay the tax~
A. Very true.
Q. And that was because you had assumed the

position of

seller~

A. I don't know about that." * * *
At Page 208:
'' Q. But Simpson would still be the one to get

the plates to Bates, wouldn't

he~

A. No, I would.''
Of course, as a matter of law, when Saunders signed
Exhibit 1 as seller and dealer he assumed the responsibility of seller and dealer, and cannot be heard now to
say that there was some other arrangement.
Tlie question of estoppel and contract are treated
under Point IV of this brief. At this time it is simply
brought to the Court's attention that Saunders' own
testimony is to the effect that his understanding with
Simpson was that he was to assume the responsibility
of seller. Bates was to look to him for performance
and delivery of title. Obviously the Trial Judge erred
in failing to find that Saunders was liable to Bates as
a primary party or at all.

1
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POINT NO. IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT BET\VEEN BATES AND SIMPSON FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF THE 1947 CHEVROLET IN
QUESTION.
(a) The only contract in existence concerning the
said automobile zcas between Bates as the buyer and
Saunders as seller.

Bates first came into the used car lot at 999 South
State Street on November 5, 1949. At that time, after
looking at several automobiles and trying out the Chevrolet in question, he signed the used car order (Exhibit
A) and the purchase contract (Exhibit 1). He says he
also signed an application for registration at that time,
but this document, if it existed, was never introduced
in evidence. Exhibit A was filled out by Simpson but
the name of the seller was not filled in. Several copies
of Exhibit 1 were signed in blank. (R. 77, 79, 80) The
name of the seller likewise was not filled in on Exhibit 1.
At that time there was no completed contract for the
sale of the automobile. The effect of Bates' signature
on these documents was to make an offer for the purchase
of the automobile on the terms and for the amount indicated in the document. The offer had not been accepted
by the seller and there was no contract in existence.
Simpson did not have a contract with Bates but he only
had an offer as a used car dealer from Bates to purchase the automobile for the sum indicated therein.
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Simpson took this offer to Saunders with the request that Saunders sign as seller, so that the deal could
be financed through Strevell-Paterson. Saunders agreed
to this arrangement and took Exhibit 1 to Strevell-Paterson Company and there filled in his name as seller and
his address. He left all but one copy at Strevell. About
a week later Bates got a copy of Exhibit 1 through the
mail, with Saunders' name and address filled in as
seller. (R. 80) The contract, then, was between Saunders
and Bates, and this was the only contract for the sale
of the automobile that was in existence.
Despite these facts, the Court found that Simpson
sold to Bates the automobile in question. (Findings Nos.
11 and 12; R. 40) The Court definitely found that Simpson was the seller to Bates and that he undertook the
obligation as seller.
Bates was not concerned at the time he executed
Exhibit A and Exhibit 1 as to the identity of the seller.
When he received Exhibit 1 in the mail, with the name
of Saunders filled in, he accepted it without question
and without reservation. In the course of the direct
examination his counsel asked him:

"Q. What did you think when this purchase
agreement was returned to you under the
signature, W. J. Saunders?
A. Well, he told me before that Bill Saunders
had got it financed through Strevell-Paterson and I thought everything was okeh. I
couldn't see anytning wrong with it.
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Q. What were your understandings of a finance
company before financing a car?

A. \Veil, I thought they had to have the title
and registration before they put the money
out on it.
Q.

~\.nd

did you think a finance company would
finance an automobile before it had the title~

A. I did not." (R. 85-86)

•

Bates further testified that he thought Simpson
had authority to sell the car since the car was on the
lot, and that when he received the papers back from
Strevell-Paterson Company the seller had furnished
title and registration to the Company. (R. 88-89)
On cross-examination Bates detailed the fact that
Exhibit 1 and Exhibit B, which is a carbon copy of Exhibit A, were signed in blank. None of the information
was on the sales contract except Bates' signature. Bates
was asked on cross-examination:
'' Q. Now what did you ask Mr. Simpson about
who you were buying the car from~ What
was said about who would be the dealer~

A. It wasn't dealer mentioned there. He mentioned the finance company; that they would
either be one of either finance companies.
He didn't say who was going to be dealer
on it.
Q. Did he say that it might be either himself
or Saunders that would be the dealer?

A. Well, that was later. He didn't say anything
about who might be. He told me later that
37
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Saunders was his partner and he had got it
through Strevell-Paterson.
Q. And that Saunders would be the one that
would sign as seller 1

A. He
me
got
* *

didn't say anything about it. He told
about a week later that Saunders had
it through Strevell-Paterson.
* *

Q. Now then, shortly thereafter you received
Exhibit B through the mail, is that correct?

A. Two weeks after I bought the car.

Q. And did you notice at that time that Saunders was indicated as the one who was selling
the car to you f
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Simpson, on the 17th of
November, did you say anything to Simpson
then as to why Saunders was the one who
was selling you the car f

A. No, I didn't say anything. I didn't think
there was nothing wrong with the transaction at all. I didn't feel like bringing it
up. I was wondering about the plates,
though.
Q. Weren't you concerned at all when you
bought a car from-thought you had bought
a car from Simpson and the contract came
out that you had bought it from Saunders?

A. Well, the two names was on the place there.
I couldn't see anything wrong with it." (R.
110-111.)
Bates was content to deal with Simpson as salesman. He did not care who the seller of the automobile

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was. He authorized Simpson to obtain the seller's signature, to accept the offer which he had made as buyer.
Even though it be assumed that there was a contract between Bates and Simpson and that Bates thought
he was going to get the title from Simpson as seller,
w'hen he received the completed contract in the mail
and failed to object to Saunders as seller, he accepted
the alteration and was bound by the terms of the altered
contract. At no time from the moment he received the
completed contract in the mail until now has Bates ever
objected to Saunders being named as the seller of the
automobile. If there has been an alteration, Bates has
assented to it.
In Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 6, Par.
1896, at Page 5319, it is stated:

"If the writing is unsealed and the statute of
frauds inapplicable, an authorized alteration is
binding upon both parties, and the altered form
of the contract, not the original form, will be
enforced.''
At Page 5320 of the same paragraph it is stated:
"Ratification, subsequent to the alteration,
has as full an effect as authority originally
granted, and ratification may be shown by any
conduct fro)ll which assent can fairly be implied.
It has been well said, 'The rule is just and supported by the authorities that where a document
has been altered and notice of such alteration is
brought to the attention of the parties affected,
it is their duty to disallow it at once, or within a
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reasonable time after learning thereof, or they
are bound by the document as altered.' "
In Paragraph 1897 in the same volume of Williston,
at Page 5321 it is stated:
''A redelivery, therefore, of a sealed instrument by the obligor after it has been altered will
make it binding in its altered form.''
Section 437 of Volume 2 of the Restatement of Law
on Contracts, is in part as follows:
"437. EFFECT OF ASSENT TO OR FORGIVENESS OF ALTERATION.
If a material and fraudulent alteration is
made by one party to a written contract or memorandum, and the other party, with knowledge of
the facts, manifests
(a) assent to the altered terms, the manifestation operates as an acceptance of an
offer to substitute for the original contract or memorandum an agreement in
the altered form;
(b) a willingness to excuse the alteration or
to remain subject to the duties that would
exist under the contract if it were unaltered, the manifestations revives the
contract in its original form.
''Comment:
a. An alteration in a written contract authorized by a party thereto before the alteration is
made cannot be fraudulent as to him. There will
in effect be assent to the formation of a new contrac-t containing all the terms of the earlier one
except as the agreed alteration changes them.''
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In the face of these facts and this authority, how
could the trial court be justified in failing to find that
the contract was between Bates and Saunders¥
(b) The parol evidence nd e prohibits the introduction of eridence to vary the terms and to substitute
the parties to a zcritten instrument.
As heretofore discussed, Bates received Exhibit 1,
the purchase agreement, from Strevell-Paterson showing Saunders as the seller-dealer, and as testified by
Bates, he knew and observed after receipt of Exhibit 1
from the Finance Company that Saunders was the sellerdealer. Thereafter he made three of the monthly payments called for under the agreement. As heretofore
indicated, he had ratified and accepted the purchase
agreement which he had signed in blank.
The plaintiff Bates had never attempted by his
pleadings or otherwise to set aside the contract with
Saunders and have it determined null and void, but in
his action he attempted by his pleadings to hold Saunders on that contract. At the very beginning of Bates'
testimony, at Page 73, the following questions and
answers were made :
'' Q. And did you talk to Jimmie

Simpson~

A. Yes.
Q. Tell us what you said and what he said.

MR. BURTON: We object to this as being
entirely hearsay as to the Employers Liability
Corporation. May I ask one or two questions on
voir dire~''
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At Pages 74 and 75 Bates testified that Exhibit 1
was the contract under which he had made three payments to Strevell-Paterson. At Page 75 the following
objection was then made :
"MR. BURTON: And we make the motion
then, further at this time, that any statements
made between Simpson or any conversation had
with Simpson and this witness are hearsay and
an attempt to vary the terms of a written contract
and all of the terms of the contract are found in
this Exhibit 1."
On Page 76, after overruling the objection, the following discussion took place :
"MR. BURTON: Could our objection be
understood as running to all of the conversation
with Simpson'
THE COURT: Yes, it may."
Exhibit 1 contains the provision: "This agreement
constitutes the entire contract between the parties.'' It
is submitted, therefore, that as to the surety, Bates, by
his actions in signing Exhibit 1 in blank, by thereafter
accepting it, and thereafter by this action seeking to
enforce that contract against Saunders, is precluded
from attempting to vary the terms of that contract by
parol, and the Court erred in admitting parol evidence
to vary Exhibit 1. Especially is this true where, as heretofore pointed out, there was no fraud shown, nor was
there any imposition upon Bates in the matter of filling
in the blanks or securing the signature of Saunders. No
such fraud is alleged or claimed by plaintiff. There is
42
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no attempt on his part to show a contract for the purchase of the car other than as contained in Exhibit 1.
(c) Saunders is estopped to deny that he was the

seller of the automobile to Bates in view of his express
representations to Bates and to Strevell-Paterson Finance Company.
As heretofore· pointed out, Saunders stated to Strevell-Paterson and to Bates by signing the purchase agreement that he was the seller of the automobile. Bates
relied on the statement in making payments to Strevell.
He further relied upon it in leaving the Ford which he
traded in on the Chevrolet at the used car lot, and in
treating the transaction as being completed. Bates believed Saunders was the seller. Strevell-Paterson relied
on the representations in advancing the money to Simpson and in financing the transaction. All of the elements
of estoppel are present. Saunders is in no position to
refuse to respond to the obligation imposed by law
upon him as seller.
POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
SIMPSON WAS LIABLE TO SAUNDERS FOR VIOLATION OF THE ACT.
(a) The Court erred in finding that Simpson sold

Saunders a contract, since Simpson did not have a contract with Bates.
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This question has been discussed under Point No.
IV, particularly subdivision (a) thereof, and no purpose
will be served by restating the argument therein set out.
The Court found in the second set of findings presented by counsel for Saunders (Finding No. 4, R. 50)
that Simpson sold a purchase agreement to Saunders.
This is a fallacious theory, since in the first place Simpson did not have a contract with Bates to sell to anybody. All he had was an offer. In the second place, the
sale of a contract, as much as the sale of any other valuable right or thing, is itself a contract and must be supported by consideration. Simpson paid no consideration
to Saunders or Saunders to Simpson. Each was to benefit from the transaction, but Saunders was to be remunerated by Strevell-Paterson, while Simpson was to be
paid by Bates. There was no transaction-certainly no
misrepresentation-as such between Saunders and Simpson on which Simpson can be liable to Saunders.
(b) No statutory liability exists as to the sale of a
contract as distinguished from the sale of a;n automobile.

The Court predicates liability by Simpson to Saunders upon the statute which requires persons who bring
automobiles into the State of Utah for the purpose of
transferring title to register such automobiles within a
prescribed period of time. (Finding of Fact No. 12;
R. 52; Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 53) As heretofore
pointed out, the appellant does not admit that this statute
confers a private right upon any person, but if it does,
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certainly the right can only be conferred upon the person who purchases an automobile. Neither did Saunders
contend nor did the Trial Court find that Simpson sold
Saunders an automobile. Just the reverse is true. Saunders contended and the Trial Court found that Simpson
did not sell Saunders an automobile, but that Saunders
purchased the contract. Saunders expressly denied in
the record that he bought the car from Simpson. At
Page 194 it is stated:

"Q. And that is what you did-you bought a car
from 'eimpson as a matter of helping him
get credit through Strevell-Paterson on financing!
A. No sir, no sir."
If Saunders' theory was that Simpson assigned to

him a valuable right which he had to require Bates to
purchase the car and obtain the title from the Continental Bank by paying the draft, Saunders could not
possibly recover, because as to this possibility there was
no breach of any obligation, no misrepresentation, and
no violation of any statute. Certainly the Court erred
in stretching the statute to hold Simpson and the Bonding Company liable to Saunders for an imagined violation.

POINT NO. VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LIMITED, CREDIT AS
AGAINST SAUNDERS' FOR $29.90 PAID TO SAUN45
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DERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING LICENSE PLATES AND PAYING SALES TAX.
The Court gave judgment to Saunders against
Simpson in the amount of $867.75. This was the sum
that Strevell-Paterson Finance Company debited Saunders' account when the automobile was repossessed by
Brokaw-Bauer and Bates defaulted on his contract, after
deducting Saunders' reserve from the transaction. Saunders admitted, however, that he kept out the amount
which he turned over to Simpson $29.90 for the purpose
of obtaining registration of the automobile in Utah and
paying the sales tax. (R. 207) No credit was given by
the Court for this sum. Even if Simpson was liable to
Saunders, the amount of the judgment should be reduced in this amount.
POINT NO. VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AND CONCLUDE THAT SAUNDERS IS LIABLE
TO EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., FOR ALL AMOUNTS AWARDED
TO BATES AGAINST SAUNDERS ANDjOR SIMPSON IN THIS TRANSACTION ON THE BOND APPLICATION AGREENIENT BETWEEN SAUNDERS
AND EMPLOYERS.
There was introduced as Exhibit B by Employers
the application for surety bond executed by defendant
Saunders to the Employers Company. As a part of the
application, Saunders agreed:
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''Second, to indemnify the said company
against all loss, liability, costs, damages, attorney~' fees and expenses whatever, which the company may sustain or incur by reason of executing
said bond, in making any investigation on account
thereof, in prosecuting or defending any action
which may be brought in connection therewith, in
obtaining a release therefrom, and in enforcing
any of the agreements herein contained.''
It is clear that Saunders was liable to Bates, and
the liability therefore accrued against Employers Company. Both as a joint venturer, therefore, and in his
own right as seller to Bates, Saunders is liable to Employers on this bond application. The Trial Judge
clearly erred in failing to grant judgment in favor of
Employers and against Saunders, and in failing to require Saunders to hold Employers liable for the amount
of the judgment.
In fact, the Trial Judge's theory seemed to be that
he had a bonding company before him, and that he would
work out some holding that would permit the plaintiff
to recover against the bonding company and permit
recovery against the bonding company by Saunders,
regardless of the legal considerations involved. The
liability of Saunders to the bonding company in the
event of judgment against him accounts for the unusual

effort to free Saunders from liability.
It is submitted that the failure of the Court to grant
judgment to Employers Company and against Saunders
is plain and reversible error.
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POINT NO. VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO l\fAKE
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE ALLEGA1,ION
OF THE COMPLAINT OF BATES AND THE CROSSCOMPLAINT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., AGAINST
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-DEFENDANT SAUNDERS.
Plaintiff's amended complaint states in substance
that Saunders falsely and fraudulently represented to
plaintiff and to Strevell-Paterson Finance Company that
the title was held by Saunders and Strevell-Paterson,
and that every representation made by Simpson to
plaintiff was true; that plaintiff believed said representations and relied thereon, and that he was thereby
damaged. (Par. 10 of said Amended Complaint; R. 14)
Plaintiff further alleged that Saunders violated the laws
of the State of Utah in failing to register the vehicle in
question, failing to obtain a certificate of title transferring same to plaintiff, and that Saunders was further
liable in adopting the contract prepared by Simpson.
(Pars. 14, 15 and 16 of said Amended Complaint; R. 15)
The Employers' Company alleged in its cross-complaint against Saunders that the sale of the automobile
by Simpson and Saunders was in pursuit of the business
of these persons as a joint enterprise; that Saunders
was aware of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale, and that he was liable as a principal
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to Bates and therefore liable to Employers on his indemnity agreement. (Pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 ; R. 29) Employers further alleged that Saunders sold the car to
Bates and that he did not have title and knew he did
not, and that he was primarily liable by reason of the
subsequent obligations placed on the seller of the automobile. (Pars. 3 and 4, R. 30.)
At no point in the two sets of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Bates and
Saunders did the Court make findings on these questions. Counsel for plaintiff apparently felt that he
should make an effort, so he included the finding, "that
the allegations in plaintiff's complaint against defendant
W. J. Saunders except as stated in these findings, are
not sustained by the evidence and are untrue.'' No
further effort was made to explain away Saunders'
liability to Bates.
This Court has held in decisions too numerous to
require citation that litigants are entitled to findings
upon all questions of fact raised by their pleadings.
The questions raised as to the knowledge of Saunders,
his signing the purchase document as seller, his participation in the transaction, and his remuneration from
Strevell, together with questions concerning adoption
and ratification by him, are all seriously raised by plaintiff and by this appellant. The fact is that there is no
evidence in the record and none available except that
the contentions made as to Saunders' liability are true.
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No facts could be found except that which would require
a conclusion that Saunders was liable.
Certainly the Trial Court erred in failing to make
findings on these important issues.
CONCLUSION
The errors of the Trial Court require a new trial.
Judgment sholild in any event be entered in favor of
Employer against Simpson on its indemnity agreement.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
and RICHARDS
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